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Uniform Commercial Code: Disclaimer
of Implied Warranties from a
Manufacturer's Perspective
I. Introduction
Under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) the sale of goods
by a merchant may create implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness.' An implied warranty of merchantability requires, inter alia,
that the goods be of sufficient quality to pass without objection in the
trade and be fit for the ordinary uses of such goods.2  An implied
warranty of fitness requires the seller to provide suitable goods when
he has reason to know of the particular purpose for which the goods
will be used and the buyer relies upon the seller's skill and judgment.3
These warranties arise by operation of law. 4  Section 2-316 of the
Code, nevertheless, authorizes sellers to disclaim implied warranties.
5
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314 to -315.
2. Id. § 2-314(2); see, e.g., Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bur. Coop. Ass'n,
153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972).
3. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315. The main difference between im-
plied warranties of merchantability and fitness is that the former are concerned with
the ordinary purposes for which goods are used, while the latter envisage a specific
use by the buyer that is peculiar to his business. Id., Comment 2.
4. See, e.g., Dougall v. Brown Bay Boat Works & Sales, Inc., 287 Minn. 290,
178 N.W.2d 217 (1970); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959);
Frigidinners v. Branchtown Gun Club, 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A.2d 202 (1954). The
Beck court stated,
An implied warranty is not one of the contractual elements of an agree-
ment. It is not one of the essential elements to be stated in the contract
nor does its application or effective existence rest or depend upon the af-
firmative intention of the parties. It is a child of the law. . . . It arises
independently and outside of the contract.
256 Minn. at 558, 99 N.W.2d at 680.
5. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-316(2)-(3):
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty
of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchant-
ability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or
modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing
and conspicuous ...
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are
excluded by expressions like 'as is,' 'with all faults' or other language
which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the ex-
clusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied war-
ranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the
goods . . . as fully as he desired or has refused to examine . . . there
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
This section is a compromise of two primary goals of the UCC:
freedom of contract and protection of buyers from uncommunicated
waivers of their rights. 6
This comment will review and analyze requirements for effective
disclaimers of implied warranties in commercial sales. First, rules of
construction for interpreting disclaimers will be discussed. Second,
the requirements for excluding implied warranties by express lan-
guage and by conduct of the parties will be reviewed. Last, manu-
facturers' ability to limit remedies for breach of warranty and effec-
tuate disclaimers of strict liability and negligence will be considered.
IL Rules of Construction
Disclaimers of implied warranties are disfavored by the law and
are strictly construed against sellers for reasons of public policy."
Courts often require that disclaimers of implied warranties of mer-
chantability and fitness be affirmatively pleaded and proved by the
party seeking to establish their validity." Strict construction complies
with the purpose of UCC section 2-316:
[T]o protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language
of disclaimer by denying effect to such language when incon-
sistent with language of express warranty and permitting the ex-
clusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or
other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise.9
is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination
ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course
of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
Implied warranty disclaimers for consumer products distributed in commerce that re-
tail for more than five dollars also must satisfy the requirements of the Consumer
Product Warranties Act (Moss-Magnuson Act), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2308 (Supp. 1976),
when the consumer product has been expressly warranted by the supplier.
6. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-102, 2-316, Comment 1.
7. Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bur. Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 45,
286 N.E.2d 188, 196 (1972); accord, Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas
Indus., Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 297, 216 N.E.2d 282 (1965); Geo. C. Christopher & Son,
Inc. v. Kansas Paint & Color Co., 215 Kan. 185, 523 P.2d 709 (1974); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); cf. Mintz v. Daimler-Benz
of N. Am., 73 Misc. 2d 212, 341 N.Y.S.2d 781 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973).
8. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman, 227 So. 2d 246 (Fla. App. 1969);
Dougall v. Brown Bay Boat Works & Sales, Inc., 287 Minn. 290, 178 N.W.2d 217
(1970); Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380 (1971).
9. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, Comment 1. Strict construction of
disclaimers also conforms with common sense:
[P]urported disclaimers of warranty in the conditional sale contract .
highlight the absurdity of a rule of law which elevates these bland and sub-
stantially meaningless terms . . . above the individually and expressly nego-
tiated terms . . . . To adhere to such a rule . . . presumes that the buyer
of a brand new automobile intends to nullify . . . all of things for which
In implementing the rule of strict construction courts have held
that disclaimers must be explicit and clear, 10 that they must state with
specificity which warranty is being disclaimed," that specific dis-
claimer of one implied warranty is not operative to disclaim all im-
plied warranties,' 2 and that disclaimers will not be implied despite
inclusive wording.' 3 Furthermore, ambiguities in an exculpatory
clause will be construed against the party who drafted the provision,
usually the seller or manufacturer.' 4 In short, manufacturers who
wish to disclaim implied warranties should avoid vague or circuitous
contract language.
Disclaimers of implied warranties also can be incorporated into
sales contracts by reference. 5 Manufacturers using this method
should note, however, that rules for incorporation by reference, as
well as the requirements of section 2-316, must be satisfied.
For the terms of another document to be incorporated into the
document executed by the parties, the reference must be clear
and unequivocal, and must be called to the attention of the
other party, he must consent thereto, and the terms of the in-
corporated document must be known or easily available to the
contracting parties.'6
Furthermore, manufacturers must remember that a "reference by the
contracting parties to an extraneous writing for a particular purpose
makes it a part of their agreement only for the purpose specified."'
7
The entire extraneous writing will not be incorporated unless it is
explicitly incorporated in its entirety.' 8
he has specifically bargained and will pay. We would presume the buyer
does just the opposite.
Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 193, 484 P.2d 380, 385 (1971).
10. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964)
(applying Pa. law); Dougall v. Brown Bay Boat Works & Sales, Inc., 287 Minn. 290,
178 N.W.2d 217 (1970); L. & N. Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa. Super. 117, 146 A.2d
154 (1958); Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d 1346
(1971).
11. See, e.g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Flexible Tubing Corp., 270 F. Supp. 548
(D. Conn. 1967); Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Indus., Inc., 68 I11. App.
2d 297, 216 N.E.2d 282 (1965); Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380
(1971).
12. See Dry Clime Lamp Corp. v. Edwards, 389 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1968);
Water Works & Indus. Supply Co. v. Wilburn, 437 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1968).
13. See Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d I1 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 264 So. 2d 418
(Fla. 1972).
14. See Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Banks, 76 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1935);
Associates Discount Corp. v. Greisinger, 103 F. Supp. 705 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Henry
v. W.S. Reichenbach & Son, Inc., 45 Pa. D. & C.2d 171 (C.P. Lehigh 1968).
15. See generally Whitman, Incorporation by Reference in Commercial Con-
tracts, 21 MD. L. REv. 1 (1961).
16. Williams Constr. Co. v. Standard-Pacific Corp., 254 Cal. App. 2d 442, 454,
61 Cal. Rptr. 912, 920 (1967); M.J. Delaney Co. v. Murchison, 393 S.W.2d 705, 709
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
17. Guerini Stone Co. v. P.J. Carlin Constr. Co., 240 U.S. 264, 277 (1916).
18. Michael v. S.S. Thanasis, 311 F. Supp. 170, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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III. Exclusion or Modification of Implied Warranties by Express
Language
A. Disclaimers Must Be Bargained For
The official Code commentary states that the purpose of section
2-316 is "to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained
language of disclaimer . *..."'I Implicit is the requirement that
disclaimers of implied warranties be bargained for,20 a requirement
willingly applied by courts. A Washington appellate court noted that
"[kinowledge of a disclaimer is not sufficient to defeat an action for
breach of warranty. A disclaimer to be effective must be bargained
for."'" Other courts have held that disclaimers delivered subsequent
to a sale are ineffective, unilateral attempts by one party to limit its
obligations.22
The bargained-for requirement is easily satisfied when a manu-
facturer sells its product to immediate customers. Problems arise,
however, when a manufacturer attempts to disclaim implied warran-
ties against remote purchasers. No bargain exists between these
parties. A manufacturer's issuance of a disclaimer with his product
is not enough. Many courts have applied common-law privity rules
and concluded that disclaimers of implied warranties do not follow
items to remote buyers. 23  Others have reasoned that disclaimers
must satisfy the contractual requirement of assent before they can
become effective. 24  For instance, the Delaware Superior Court re-
cently stated that
unless it can be shown that the parties did ... contract to such
a limitation rather than merely accepting the manufacturer's
19. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, Comment 1.
20. Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. App. 1972);
see Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 861, 454 S.W.2d
307, 309 (1970); Royal Pioneer Paper Box Mfg. Co. v. Louis DeJonge & Co., 179
Pa. Super. 155, 163, 115 A.2d 837, 840 (1955); 3 A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONESCA,
WILLISTON ON SALES 170-71 (4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
21. Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 200, 491 P.2d 1346,
1350 (1971).
22. International Harv. Co. v. Pike, 249 Ark. 1026, 1036, 466 S.W.2d 901, 907
(1971); see Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 6 Conn. Cir. 478, -, 276 A.2d 807,
811, cert. denied, 160 Conn. 590, 274 A.2d 884 (1970); Zabriskie Chev., Inc. v.
Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 448, 240 A.2d 195, 199 (L. Div. 1968).
23. Callahan v. Keystone Fireworks Mfg. Co., 72 Wash. 2d 823, 831, 435 P.2d
626, 632 (1967) (and cases cited therein); see Stewart v. Gainesville Glass Co., 131
Ga. App. 747, 751, 206 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1974); Foremost Mobile Homes Mfg. Corp.
v. Steele, 506 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
24. See Dillon v. General Motors Corp., - Del. Super -, -, 315 A.2d 732,
734-35 (1974).
express warranty as a statement of the manufacturer's policy,
that policy cannot be accepted by this Court as a contract. 25
Still other courts have invoked section 2-316 to negate disclaimers of
implied warranties against remote buyers because under that section
only sellers can disclaim implied warranties. 26 A restrictive construc-
tion of the term "seller" bars disclaimers by manufacturers who do
not make the final sale of their product.27 In Ford Motor Co. v.
Pittman 2 the court determined that Ford was not a seller by relying
heavily on an officer's testimony that Ford neither serviced nor sold
vehicles to retail purchasers.29
The assertion that manufacturers are not sellers under section 2-
316 is strained and fallacious. Manufacturers produce and market
their products with the ultimate purchaser in mind. Sales to remote
purchasers financially benefit the manufacturer. Fairness and a
reasonable interpretation of the term "seller" demand that the manu-
facturers have their freedom of contract preserved and be allowed to
disclaim implied warranties of merchantability and fitness if they
comply with the requirements of section 2-316. Courts seeking to
protect uninformed consumers should rely on the Code's unconscion-
ability provisions ° instead of resorting to artificial construction of
words.
Not all courts refuse to allow remote manufacturers to exclude
or modify implied warranties. Some jurisdictions look to the third-
party beneficiary doctrine.81 In K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corp.8" the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
where a contract for the sale of goods between a dealer and a
buyer contains a provision dealing with the liability of the man-
ufacturer of the goods, that provision inures to the benefit of the
manufacturer in an action by the buyer to recover from the man-
ufacturer for breach of warranty.
33
25. Id.
26. "Seller" is defined by the Code as a person who sells or contracts to sell
goods. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-103(d).
27. Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman, 227 So. 2d 246, 249 (Fla. App. 1969); accord,
Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. App. 1972); Haugen v. Ford
Motor Co., 219 N.W.2d 462, 468-69 (N.D. 1974).
28. 227 So. 2d 246 (Fla. App. 1969).
29. Id. at 249.
30. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
31. See K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 309-10, 263
A.2d 390, 393 (1970); Sanders v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 237 S.C. 133, 115 S.E.2d
793 (1960); Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1964).
Third-party beneficiary contracts are contracts between two persons that benefit
a third party. The third party need not be in privity with the contracting parties nor
is he required to give consideration. To enforce this contract the third party need
only show that the contracting parties intended him to benefit. Line Lexington
Lumber & Millwork Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Corp., 451 Pa. 154, 301 A.2d 684
(1973); Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960).
32. 437 Pa. 303, 263 A.2d 390 (1970).
33. Id. at 309, 263 A.2d at 393.
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In support of its conclusion the court cited Sanders v. Allis Chalmers
Manufacturing Co.34 and Williams v. Chrysler Corp.85 In each case
the manufacturer established himself as a third-party beneficiary by
proving that the sales contract evinced a clear intent to benefit him.8 6
The contracts in Westinghouse and Chrysler explicitly referred to the
manufacturer's liability. Although naming the third party facilitates
finding the requisite intent to benefit him, he "need not be named in
the contract, as long as he is contemplated by the parties to the
contract and sufficiently identified."3 7 In light of the judicial tenden-
cy to construe disclaimers strictly, however, manufacturers should
specifically mention themselves in the disclaimer.
A second method by which courts allow manufacturers to ex-
clude or limit implied warranties to remote purchasers is to drop the
privity requirement for breach of warranty actions and recognize
that, although not in privity, the manufacturer and buyer are in reality
dealing with each other.3 8 Logically, if privity does not bar an action
for breach of warranty, it also should not bar exclusion or modifica-
tion of implied warranties. In Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing
Co. 9 the court made an exception to Georgia's strict privity require-
ment for breach of warranty actions when an auto manufacturer sold
and warranted his products through an authorized local dealer. In
conjunction with this authorizing exception the court recognized that
manufacturers could disclaim implied warranties running to remote
purchasers.4 °
Although disclaimers technically must be bargained for, the
modem trend is to regard this requirement as satisfied when a distrib-
utor bargains with a buyer. The manufacturer is deemed a third-
party beneficiary of this bargain. Even a bargained-for disclaimer,
34. 237 S.C. 133, 115 S.E.2d 793 (1960). In that case the court asserted that
a manufacturer can warrant his products to ultimate purchasers. "There is no
obstacle preventing a manufacturer from making a contract with an ultimate consum-
er to guarantee an article sold to the latter, directly or indirectly, if the elements of
intention to contract and consideration are present .... "Id. at 138-39, 115 S.E.2d
at 795.
35. 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1964).
36. Cases cited note 31 supra.
37. Chitlik v. Allstate Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 2d 193, 197, 299 N.E.2d 295, 297
(1973); see Runco v. Brockway Motor Co., 164 Pa. Super. 240, 242, 63 A.2d 397,
399 (1949).
38. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); Meyer v. Gehl Co., 42 App. Div. 2d 461, 348 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1973)
(dictum).
39. 132 Ga. App. 435, 208 S.E.2d 321 (1974).
40. Id. at 437, 208 S.E.2d at 323.
however, has more legal hurdles to surmount before it can be en-
forced.
B. Disclaimers Must Be Conspicuous
Section 2-316 requires that disclaimers of implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness be in writing and be conspicuous.41 Con-
spicuousness is a common subject of litigation and legal comment.
42
The UCC definition is as follows:
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a rea-
sonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have no-
ticed it. A printed heading in capitals . . . is conspicuous.
Language in the body of a form is 'conspicuous' if it is in larger
or other contrasting type or color. But in a telegram any stated
term is 'conspicuous.' Whether a term or clause is 'conspicuous'
or not is for decision by the court.
43
The Code comments suggest that courts should test conspicuousness
by asking if "attention can reasonably be expected to be called to [the
term or clause]. 44
Several courts have held that a disclaimer in print the same size
and color as other contract terms is void.45  In Greenspun v. Ameri-
can Adhesives, Inc.46 a disclaimer was held not conspicuous even
though some letters were capitalized and the provision was set off
slightly from the remainder of the contract. "A provision is not
conspicuous when there is only a slight contrast with the balance of
the instrument. ' 47  To satisfy the conspicuousness requirement,
therefore, disclaimers should be set forth in larger, contrasting type
and in a darker shade of black or in red or some other attention-
catching color.48
Even if larger, contrasting type is used, the disclaimer must be
prominently placed to qualify as conspicuous. In Hunt v. Perkins
41. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2). Disclaimers of the implied
warranty of merchantability also are required to mention the term "merchantability."
42. See, e.g., Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1973);
Greenspun v. American Adhesives, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 442, 444 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Geo.
C. Christopher & Son, Inc. v. Kansas Paint & Color Co., 215 Kan. 195, 205, 523 P.2d
709, 718 (1974); Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 App. Div. 2d 17, 20, 304 N.Y.S.2d
918, 922 (1969); Mid-Continent Refrig. Co. v. Way, 263 S.C. 101, 109, 208 S.E.2d
31, 34 (1974); Moye, Exclusion and Modification of Warranty Under the U.C.C., 46
DENvER L.J. 579 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Moye].
43. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(10).
44. Id., Comment 10.
45. E.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585, 593 (8th Cir. 1964)
(applying Pa. law); Chemco Indus. Applicators, Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 366 F. Supp. 278, 285 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Jet Asphalt &
Rock Co., 246 Ark. 101, 108, 437 S.W.2d 459, 463 (1969).
46. 320 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
47. Id. at 444; see International Harv. Co. v. Pike, 249 Ark. 1026, 466 S.W.2d
901 (1971).
48. 3 R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES & BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7.03 (1969).
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Machinery Co.49 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts invali-
dated a disclaimer on the reverse side of a purchase order. 50 Similar-
ly, a recent Pennsylvania decision, Adams Van Service, Inc. v. Inter-
national Harvester Corp.,"' held a disclaimer inconspicuous because it
was located on the reverse side of a sales contract and references to it
on the front were inconspicuous.52  Other decisions have declared
that "an attempted disclaimer is ineffective, as a matter of law, and
fails of its purpose when it is in the body of an instrument and in type
of the same size and color as other provisions."53 Disclaimers buried
in the fine print of invoices,54 customer receipts, 5 operators man-
uals,56 and labels57 have been held insufficiently prominent to qualify
as conspicuous under the Code. On the other hand, a disclaimer on
the reverse side of an agreement that was set in bold type and
separated by a heavy black line has been considered sufficiently con-
spicuous.5
8
Many courts void inconspicuous disclaimers without inquiring
whether the buyer was protected from an unexpected and unbar-
gained disclaimer by circumstances other than the clause's physical
49. 352 Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d 228 (1967).
50. Id. at 541, 226 N.E.2d at 232:
mhe provisions on the front of the purchase order did not make adequate
reference to the provisions on the back of the order to draw attention to
the latter. Hence the provisions on the back of the order cannot be said
to be conspicuous although printed in an adequate size and style of type.
51. 122 Pitts. 151 (Pa. C.P. 1973).
52. Id. at 153; accord, Salov v. Don Allen Chev. Co., 55 Pa. D. & C.2d 180
(C.P. Allegh. 1971).
53. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 246 Ark. 101, 108, 437
S.W.2d 459, 463 (1969) (emphasis added).
54. Greenspun v. American Adhesives, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1970);
Geo. C. Christopher & Son, Inc. v. Kansas Paint & Color Co., 215 Kan. 185, 523 P.2d
709 (1974).
55. Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bur. Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286
N.E.2d 188 (1972).
56. Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Huntsman, 246 Ark. 149, 437 S.W.2d 784
(1969); Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. App. 1972); Omni
Flying Club, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., - Mass. -, 315 N.E.2d 885 (1974);
Zabriskie Chev., Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (L. Div. 1968).
57. Cooper Paintings & Coatings, Inc. v. SCM Corp., 62 Tenn. App. 13, 457
S.W.2d 864 (1970); Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d
1346 (1971).
58. Architectural Alum. Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 495, 333 N.Y.S.2d
818 (Sup. Ct. 1972). Other recent decisions in which disclaimers were held to be
adequately conspicious include Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc.,
404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968); Quality Accept. Corp. v. Million & Albers, Inc., 367 F.
Supp. 771, 773 (D. Wyo. 1973); Velez v. Craine & Clarke Lumber Corp., 41 App.
Div. 2d 747, 341 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1973); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202,
343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
conspicuousness. 9 The announced purpose of section 2-316, how-
ever, is "to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained lan-
guage of disclaimer by . . . permitting the exclusion of implied
warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances
which protect the buyer from surprise."0 When actual buyer aware-
ness is found, the inconspicuousness of the disclaimer should not
render it ineffective. "[A]ctual awareness . . . is another circum-
stance which protects the buyer from surprise. '"61 Adopting this view
a New York court upheld a disclaimer that appeared in the smallest
print on an invoice when the buyer's actual knowledge thereof was
proved."2 The court noted that "the statutory language is illustrative
rather than exclusive [and] each case should be judged on the basis




Evaluating buyer awareness is far more difficult than deciding
whether a provision is conspicuous. Courts, nevertheless, should not
preclude a seller from showing actual knowledge. Buyer awareness
satisfies the primary goals of section 2-316-freedom of contract
and buyer protection from unexpected disclaimers.
C. Disclaimers Through Words of Art
Section 2-316(3)(a) provides that the use of certain phrases,
such as "as is" or "with all faults," satisfies the prerequisites for a
valid disclaimer. This language6 4 notifies buyers that the seller is
disclaiming implied warranties and that the buyer has assumed the
risk of loss. 6 5  Courts have held that the sale of a used car "as is"
demonstrates to the buyer that the car is not new and that no
warranties are attached. 66
59. See Entron, Inc. v. General Cablevision, 435 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1970);
Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964) (applying Pa. law).
60. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, Comment 1 (emphasis added).
61. Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C. 423, 434, 196
S.E.2d 711, 718 (1973) (applying Pa. law) (emphasis in original); see Jacobsen v.
Benson Motors, Inc., - Iowa -, 216 N.W.2d 396 (1974); Sellman Auto, Inc. v.
McCowan, 89 Nev. 353, 513 P.2d 1228 (1973).
62. Velez v. Craine & Clarke Lumber Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d 747, 347
N.Y.S.2d 248 (1973).
63. Id. at 748, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
64. Language of similar import, such as "in its present condition," has been held
effective for excluding implied warranties. First Nat'l Bank v. Husted, 57 Ill. App.
2d 227, 236, 205 N.E.2d 780, 784 (1965). But see L & N Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188
Pa. Super. 117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958); Hull-Dobbs, Inc. v. Mallicoat, 57 Tenn. App.
100, 415 S.W.2d 344 (1966). The sale of goods "in good condition," however, has
been rejected as a disclaimer of implied warranties. Overland Bond & Invest. Corp. v.
Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 356, 292 N.E.2d 168, 174 (1972).
65. See Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Hires Bottl'g Co., 254 F. Supp. 424 (N.D.
Ill. 1966); Belvision, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 46 Misc. 2d 952, 260 N.Y.S.2d 579
(Sup. Ct. 1965).




Whether these magic phrases must be set forth conspicuously is
another matter.6 7  A literal reading of the Code indicates that they
need not. Subsection (3) exists notwithstanding the conspicuous-
ness requirement of subsection (2)."s Literal interpretation is further
bolstered by the history of section 2-316. The 1949 and 1952 drafts
placed subsection (3) within subsection (2),' 9 illustrating an intent
to treat the former subsection as a modifier of the latter 7 and to
subject it to the conspicuousness requirement. The subsequent sepa-
ration of the subsections, therefore, lends credence to the conclusion
that subsection (3) is not a mere modifier of subsection (2) and need
not be conspicuous.
On the other hand, cases that have addressed this issue have
concluded that the phrase "as is" must be conspicuous to be effective
as a disclaimer.7' Using a commonsense approach the New Jersey
Superior Court in Gindy Manufacturing Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking
Corp.72 declared,
It serves no intelligible design to protect buyers by conspicuous
language when the term 'merchantability' is used, but to allow
an effective disclaimer when the term 'as is' is buried in fine
print .... My preference ... is to find that there is a require-
ment of conspicuousness when terms like 'as is' are used to
exclude an implied warranty of merchantability or fitness. It
seems reasonable to say that to avoid these implied warranties
the requirements of subsection (2) must be met, except that
expressions like 'as is' will be given effect in addition to the
expressions specified in subsection (2) .7
67. See Osborne v. Genevie, 289 So. 2d 21 (Fla. App. 1974); Woodruff v.
Clark County Farm Bur. Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972);
Gindy Mfg. Co. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345 (L.
Div. 1970).
68. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-316(2)-(3). Subsection (2) states that
it is "[slubject to subsection (3)" and the preamble to subsection (3) declares that it
exists "[n]otwithstanding subsection (2)." Some commentators have suggested that
subsection (3) (a) means that the seller need not specifically mention merchantability
in certain situations because the phrase "as is" is commonly understood to signify that
the buyer is not receiving any warranty from the seller, making it unnecessary to
satisfy the prerequisites of subsection (2). Under this interpretation subsection (3)
merely qualifies the rigid standards of subsection (2) and the conspicuous require-
ment applies to "as is" disclaimers. WILLISTON, supra note 20, at 179.
69. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 (1949, 1952 drafts).
70. Gindy Mfg. Co. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 393, 268
A.2d 345, 351 (L. Div. 1970).
71. Cases cited note 67 supra.
72. 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345 (L. Div. 1970).
73. Id. at 396, 268 A.2d at 352-53. The Indiana Court of Appeals in Woodruff
v. Clark County Farm Bur. Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972),
cited Gindy as support for its conclusion that "as is" disclaimers must be stated
conspicuously to be effective. The court also relied heavily on a comment peculiar to
Similarly, a recent Florida Court of Appeals decision, Osborne v.
Genevie,74 noted that "[w]hile the man on the street might more
nearly comprehend the legal effect of 'as is' than a repudiation of
warranties, it makes no difference if he doesn't see the provision in
the first place."7 5
Application of the conspicuousness requirement to "as is" dis-
claimers unnecessarily involves artificial statutory construction. The
courts in Gindy and Osborne could have reached the same results
through less strained construction of section 2-316. Subsection
(3)(a) does not make "as is" disclaimers unqualifiedly effective. On
the contrary, the opening words of the subsection, "unless circum-
stances indicate otherwise,"76 provide an important limitation with
which courts can test these disclaimers through common-law princi-
ples. In this regard the pre-Code, Pennsylvania case of Savage v.
Z.S. Vertner Motor Sales Co. 77 is instructive. The court rejected
defendant's argument that the presence of the term "as is" in a used
car order precluded plaintiff's recovery for breach of warranty.
It may be that, by the proper use of such words, the plaintiff
would be precluded from recovering . . . but it would have to
clearly appear that the words were used in this sense and with
reference to the article in question. The words 'as is' follow the
words 'Purchase Price.' They are not attached to any descrip-
tion of the car, and do not refer specifically to the car, and
courts will not be astute in interpreting that words of this charac-
ter, used in connection with the purchase price, are to be con-
strued as an absolute acceptance by a purchaser of an article
irrespective of its condition. If this is the end to be desired, the
language should be clear and unequivocal and apply to the pur-
chase in no uncertain terms. Neither ambiguous and uncertain
language nor ambiguous and uncertain application, should be
used in binding a purchaser to take a defective machine or one
absolutely incapable of performing its usual and customary
functions."7
Furthermore, this "other circumstances" test permits courts to evaluate
buyer awareness of the "as is" term. Conspicuousness is but one
Indiana's enactment of § 2-316 that declares that subsection (3) has the same basic
requirements as subsection (2) and that the main import of the "notwithstanding"
preamble was to eliminate subsection (2)'s writing requirement. id. at 47-48, 286
N.E.2d at 197.
74. 289 So. 2d 21 (Fla. App. 1974).
75. Id. at 22. One commentator's assertions support the conclusions reached in
Osborne and Gindy:
While the subsection [(3)] does not explicitly so provide, it would seem
that these phrases and expressions would have to be stated conspicuously
to become effective disclaimers. Such a requirement is consistent with the
general rule that the disclaimer must 'call' to 'the buyer's attention' and
'make ... plain that there is no implied warranty.'
1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSMONAL GUmE TO THE 'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 77
(1964).
76. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(3)(a).
77. 3 Pa. D. & C. 505 (C.P. Allegh. 1923).
78. Id. at 505-06.
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indicator of whether a buyer knows of and understands a disclaimer
of implied warranties. 9
Comment 7 to section 2-316 states that the "as is" subsection,
subsection (3) (a), is a particularization of subsection (3) (c), 80
which allows exclusion or modification of implied warranties by
course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade.8' The
definitions of course of dealing and usage of trade 2 imply that the
parties must have knowledge or, at least, notice of the practice or
conduct before it can be invoked to affect a contract.83  Courts are
justified, therefore, in inquiring about a buyer's knowledge or notice
of the presence and significance of the term "as is." Lack of con-
spicuousness is just one element in this inquiry.
This approach was adopted in Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v.
Primavera.84 Plaintiff contended that any warranty of merchantabil-
ity had been disclaimed effectively by a statement at the start of the
auction that everything was being sold "as is." Defendant did not
hear this statement. The court, without discussing whether the con-
spicuousness requirement of subsection (2) applied to "as is" dis-
claimers, concluded that since defendant did not hear the statement,
he obviously did not acquiesce in the disclaimer. The court held that
the purchaser could not be charged as a matter of law with knowledge
of the disclamer and that the seller should have taken adequate steps
to make sure the buyer heard the disclaimer.
Inclusion of 'as is' language in a summary statement .
without emphasis or amplification, not repeated thereafter al-
though -the auction lasts for several hours, does not . . . ade-
quately discharge the seller's obligation to communicate the
disclaimer clearly and unmistakably to the buyer.85
Decisions giving effect to "as is" disclaimers have emphasized
that the term was bargained for and that both parties were aware of
it.8
79. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra.
80. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, Comment 7.
81. Exclusion or modification of implied warranties by course of dealing,
course of performance, or usage of trade is discussed in detail at notes 141-67 and
accompanying text infra.
82. Course of dealing is "a sequence of previous conduct between parties . . .
which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis for interpreting their
expressions and other conduct." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205(2).
83. See notes 144-50, 162-66 and accompanying text infra.
84. 68 Misc. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1972).
85. Id. at 861, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
86. E.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Hires Bottl'g Co., 254 F. Supp. 424 (N.D.
Ill. 1966); Chamberlain v. Bob Matick Chev., Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. 685, 239 A.2d 42
(1967).
Lack of buyer knowledge could have been the basis for invali-
dating the disclaimers in Gindy and Osborne.87 In Gindy the parties,
both business entities, had established a course of dealing by which
Gindy, the manufacturer-seller, agreed to repair all defective trail-
ers.8 8  This course of dealing excluded "as is" sales. The buyer
relied on this course of dealing and, thus, lacked knowledge of the "as
is" clause inserted by Gindy, a fact the court could have used to
invalidate the disclaimer. In Osborne an unsophisticated buyer
bought a new mobile home allegedly subject to an "as is" provision.89
The court might have found the disclaimer ineffective because the
buyer did not and, due to his unsophisticated nature, could not have
knowledge of its meaning."
D. Effect of Express Warranties
Manufacturers have often attempted to use a limited express
warranty to exclude implied warranties. 91 Typically an express war-
ranty will guarantee a product for defects in workmanship in lieu of
all other warranties, express or implied. 92  Pre-Code cases generally
held that these disclaimers were effective. 93 Under the Code, how-
ever, "the warranty of merchantability survives a clause which only
states that an express warranty is given in lieu of all other warran-
ties."' 94  Also, section 2-317(c) states that implied warranties of
fitness survive the presence of an inconsistent express warranty.9 5
Courts frown on furtive attempts to place all risks on the buyer.
Thus, manufacturers are advised to incur the incremental cost of
abiding by the Code's rules rather than risking sizable losses if their
disclaimers are declared invalid. If the manufacturer has a viable
product and a fair warranty, even conspicuous disclaimers are not
likely to discourage prospective purchasers.
87. See notes 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
88. 111 N.J. Super. at 386, 268 A.2d at 347.
89. 289 So. 2d at 22.
90. Id. at 23.
91. See Moye, supra note 42; Note, Warranty Disclaimers and Limitation for
Breach of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 43 B.U.L. REv. 396
(1963).
92. See Moye, supra note 42, at 602-07.
93. Id. at 603 n.140. Contra, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
94. Moye, supra note 42, at 605.
95. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-317(c); see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 1295, 110 N.W.2d 449, 453-56 (1961);
L. & N. Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa. Super. 117, 121, 146 A.2d 154, 157 (1958); cf.
Dry Clime Lamp Corp. v. Edwards, 389 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1968).
On the other hand, when a buyer gives detailed specifications and the seller-
manufacturer conforms the product to those specifications, no implied warranty of
merchantability or fitness arises. Mohasco Indus., Inc. v. Anderson-Halverson Corp.,




Additionally, if the manufacturer is a supplier of consumer
products, 90 the recently enacted Consumer Product Warranties Act
prohibits it from disclaiming or modifying implied warranties when
it has made an express warranty regarding the product in question.
97
This federal prohibition expressly supersedes contrary state law deci-
sions.
98
In transactions not subject to the Consumer Product Warranties
Act,99 state courts have treated the terms of an express warranty as
superior to those of a conspicuous disclaimer contained in the same
sales contract.00 In Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson,
Ltd.10 1 the New York Court of Appeals considered a seller's attempt
to create an unlimited express warranty of merchantability with a
time limitation on its effectiveness placed in another part of the con-
tract. The court concluded that
[a]n attempt to both warrant and refuse to warrant goods creates
an ambiguity which can only be resolved by making one term
yield -to the other ....
... Under these circumstances, the language creating the
unlimited express warranty must prevail over the time limitation
insofar as the latter modifies the warranty.'
02
E. Unconscionability of Warranty Disclaimers
Another hurdle confronting manufactuers who want to disclaim
implied warranties is the UCC's prohibition against unconscionable
contract provisions. Section 2-302 permits courts to refuse to enforce
any unconscionable clause. 10 3  The test is whether in a particular
96. Consumer product "means any tangible personal property which is distrib-
uted in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or household pur-
poses. . . ." Consumer Product Warranties Act (Moss--Magnuson Act), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 2301 (Supp. 1976).
97. Id. § 2308.
98. Id. § 2308(c).
99. A transaction is subject to the Consumer Product Warranties Act only if
it involves a "consumer product" distributed "in commerce" that sells at retail for
more than five dollars. Id. §§ 2301(1), 2301(14), 2302(e).
100. Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bur. Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 52-
53, 286 N.E.2d 188, 200 (1972); Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 341
n.2, 322 A.2d 440, 442 n.2 (1974); Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd.,
23 N.Y.2d 398, 405, 244 N.E.2d 685, 689, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 113-14 (1968); Bowen
v. Young, 507 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). These decisions are espe-
cially apropos when a dealer inserts a conspicuous disclaimer into a sales contract
containing an express warranty from the manufacturer.
101. 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1968).
102. Id. at 405, 244 N.E.2d at 689, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 113-14.
103. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(1):
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
setting the clause in question is one-sided to the point of unconsciona-
bility. "The principle is one of prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise. . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of
superior bargaining power."'1 4 The section proffers a general stand-
ard rather than an absolute rule or limiting definition. This allows
flexibility in unconscionability determinations when courts encounter
novel factual settings. 105
Section 2-302 has been evaluated by many commentators,'0 6
most of whom have focused on unsophisticated consumers or actions
to recover for personal injuries. Analysis of these materials is beyond
the scope of this comment. Instead, the next few paragraphs will
focus on issues of concern to manufacturers: whether section 2-302
affects disclaimers of implied warranties that comply with the prereq-
uisites of section 2-316 and the role of unconscionability in business
transactions.
The relationship between sections 2-302 and 2-316 has been
debated extensively. One commentator has argued,
It appears to be a matter of common assumption that section
2-302 is applicable to warranty disclaimers. I find this, frankly,
incredible. Here is 2-316 which sets forth clear, specific and
anything but easy-to-meet standards for disclaiming warranties.
It is a highly detailed section . . . . It contains no reference
of any kind to section 2-302, although nine other sections of
Article 2 contain such references. In such circumstances the
usually bland assumptions that a disclaimer which meets the re-
quirements of 2-316 might still be strikable as 'unconscionable'
under 2-302 seems explainable, if at all, as oversight, wishful
thinking or .. .attempted sneakiness
0 7
Courts have ignored this argument, however, and have held that
unconscionability is another hurdle to be traversed before a disclaimer
can be considered valid.10 8  In reaching this conclusion courts have
noted that the ten example cases cited in comment 1 to section 2-302
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
104. Id., Comment 1.
105. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 759
(1969). For an analysis of common-law definitions of unconscionability see Daven-
port, Unconseionability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. R v.
121, 123-27 (1967); Note, Definition and Interpretation of Unconscionable
Contracts, 58 DIcK. L. REV. 161 (1954).
106. See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 486 n.5
(1967); Comment, The Application of the Doctrine of Unconscionability to Warran-
ties, 38 Fonn. L. Rlv. 73 (1970); authorities cited note 105 supra.
107. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code, 115 U. PA. L. RFv. 485, 523 (1967)
(emphasis added).
108. E.g., Luick v. Graybar Elec. Co., 473 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1973); Kohlen-
berger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 256 Ark. 584, 510 S.W.2d 555 (1974); Monsanto
Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (L. Div. 1974); Sarfati v.
M.A. Hittner & Sons, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352, aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d
613, 282 N.E.2d 126, 331 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1970); Wedner v. Fidelity Sec. Sys., Inc., 228
Pa. Super. 67, 307 A.2d 429 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
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all concern warranty disclaimers or remedy limitations." 9 "The
lesson of these cases . . . surely must be . . that a warranty
disclaimer may be procedurally unimpeachable under Section 2-316
and nevertheless be unconscionable under Section 2-302. '' 110
In determining whether a disclaimer has surmounted the uncon-
scionability hurdle, courts have followed the explicit invitation of
section 2-302(2) and considered evidence of the commercial setting,
purpose, and effect of the disclaimer."' Evaluation of commercial
setting should focus on the parties' bargaining power. 12 If inequali-
ty of bargaining power exists, the inquiry is whether this inequality
resulted in unfair surprise through misleading bargaining techniques
or oppression through inclusion of one-sided terms."' Nevertheless,
a court should not consider whether or not a contract is uncon-
scionable ... unless it first determines that at the time the con-
tract was made there was such inequality of bargaining power
that one party could include terms ... which were not justifiable
on grounds of commercial necessity.' 1 4
Some courts have held that the necessary inequality of bargain-
ing power is lacking when both parties possess a modicum of business
and legal knowledge. 115 They recognize that the policy underpin-
nings for the unconscionability doctrine lose their raison d'etre when
the contracting parties are business entitites. For instance, in K & C,
Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.16 the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania dismissed an allegation that a provision excluding liability for
consequential or special damages 17 was unconscionable.
109. 'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
110. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 795 (1969)
(emphasis in original). In Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846, 850
(3d Cir. 1967), the Third Circuit stated,
Even a provision specifically disclaiming any warranty . ..would not nec-
essarily call for the defendant's freedom from liability. . . . [S]tandards
which are manifestly unreasonable may not be disclaimed and . . . the en-
forcement of unconscionable sales [is prevented] where .. . the goods ex-
changed are found to be totally worthless.
111. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(2).
112. See Comment, Bargaining Power and Unconscionability, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 998 (1966).
113. Inequality of bargaining power without more is not unconscionable. There
must be misuse of that bargaining power to unfairly surprise or oppress the other
party. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
114. Comment, Bargaining Power and Unconscionability, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
998, 1002 (1966) (emphasis added).
115. See In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966); K & C,
Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 263 A.2d 390 (1970); Wedner v.
Fidelity Sec. Sys., Inc., 228 Pa. Super. 67, 307 A.2d 429 (1973).
116. K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 263 A.2d 390
(1970).
117. The clause created limited liability pursuant to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
[I]t is clear that the exclusion was not unconscionable here,
where the buyer was hardly the sheep keeping company with
the wolves that it would have us believe... . '[T]he two owners
of the plaintiff corporation were -an attorney who had practiced
law for eleven years ... and a man who had business experience
as a rooming house landlord . . .118
Other tribunals have concluded, however, that the presence of
commercial parties, by itself, does not preclude findings of uncon-
scionability. 11 These decisions have considered the parties' relative
bargaining positions. In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp.'2" a federal district court upheld the conscionability of a dis-
claimer provision, noting that the provision had been the subject of
intensive negotiation between parties of equal bargaining strength
(two large corporations) and had not been presented on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.' 2 ' Similarly, a New York court held that a disclaimer
unconscionable as against consumer buyers was also unconscionable
as against a lessor of an automobile.1
22
The lessor . . . is in no better commercial position than the
consumer. It is in no position to alter the warranty or negotiate
for better protection and, consequently .... disclaimer of war-
ranty is equally unconscionable as to the lessor of the vehicle.
1 23
IV. Exclusion by Conduct
A. Examination
Section 2-316(3)(b) provides that when a buyer examines
goods before entering into a contract, no implied warranty arises for
those defects that ought to have been discovered during this examina-
tion. 124  Courts have strictly limited examination disclaimers when
they operate against consumer buyers. 25  The opportunity to take a
CODE § 2-719. For purposes of the present discussion the effect of this provision is
similar to § 2-316 disclaimers. For a more detailed discussion of the interrelation
between the two, see notes 168-85 and accompanying text infra.
118. 437 Pa. at 308-09, 263 A.2d at 393. Other courts have relied on Westing-
house. United States Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449, 460
(E.D. Mich. 1972); In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 871 (E.D. Pa.
1966); Wedner v. Fidelity Sec. Sys., Inc., 228 Pa. Super. 67, 72, 307 A.2d 429, 432
(1973). In Elkins-Dell the court stated, "We are not dealing with a fictional assent
by businessmen .... To hold these contracts unenforceable ... would ... impose
a judicially invented but economically dysfunctional morality upon knowledgeable
contracting parties." 253 F. Supp. at 871.
119. See Luick v. Graybar Elec. Co., 473 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1973); Arrow
Transp. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 289 F. Supp. 170, 173 (D. Ore. 1968); Monsanto Co.
v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 261-62, 326 A.2d 90, 98-99 (L. Div. 1974);
Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 1004, 1005, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352,
354, aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 613, 282 N.E.2d 126, 331 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1970).
120. 350 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Ga. 1972), alf'd, 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974).
121. Id. at 742.
122. Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d
352, aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 613, 282 N.E.2d 126, 331 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1970).
123. Id. at 1005, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
124. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(3)(b).
125. See, e.g., Zabriskie Chev., Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195
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car for "a spin around the block" does not constitute a reasonable
opportunity to inspect.
126
In sales to commercial buyers, however, examination disclaimers
provide manufacturers with excellent protection against actions for
breach of implied warranty. 127 Courts tend to presume that commer-
cial buyers will discover all but the most latent defects upon examina-
tion of the goods. In Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Machinery Corp. 2 '
no implied warranty of fitness arose when plaintiffs managing part-
ner observed machinery in operation before its purchase. The court
reasoned that if the machine was not running properly, this condition
should have been observed.2 9 In Richards Manufacturing Co. v.
Gamell ° a Washington court ruled that an implied warranty of
merchantability was excluded by the buyer's physical inspection of
the goods.
Of those few defects indicated, . . . all ought to have been
discovered by a professional buyer. Even if a more complete
inspection would have required labor and inconvenience, the
buyer does not have the right to assert an implied warranty of
quality and fitness after he has been given an opportunity to
inspect and failed to take advantage of it.' 3 '
Other courts have declared that when a commercial buyer examines a
product and rejects some items, his acceptance of the remainder is
irrevocable and without recourse.'32
Examination will not provide a complete defense to a breach of
implied warranty action when the defect is latent and undiscovera-
ble.'3 8 Nevertheless, the burden rests on the buyer to prove the
defect latent and undiscoverable upon examination.' When chemi-
(L. Div. 1968); Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161
(1972).
126. Zabriskie Chev., Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 352-53, 240 A.2d 195,
202 (L. Div. 1968).
127. See Willis v. West Ky. Feeder Pig Co., 122 Ill. App. 2d 266, 265 N.E.2d
899 (1971); Chaq. Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973); Arrow Transp. Co. v. A.O. Smith Co., 75 Wash. 2d 843, 454 P.2d 287
(1969); Richards Mfg. Co. v. Gamel, 5 Wash. App. 549, 489 P.2d 366 (1971).
128. 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
129. Id. at 879.
130. 5 Wash. App. 549, 489 P.2d 366 (1971).
131. Id. at 550, 489 P.2d at 367.
132. R.D. Lowrance, Inc. v. Petersen, 185 Neb. 679, 682, 178 N.W.2d 277, 279
(1970); see Willis v. West Ky. Feeder Pig Co., 132 Ill. App. 2d 266, 271, 265 N.E.2d
899, 903 (1971). Also, buyers with knowledge equal or superior to the manufacturer
are not permitted to "secretly rely" upon the skill and judgment of the manufacturer
after examining the goods. Arrow Transp. Co. v. A.O. Smith Co., 75 Wash. 2d 843,
851, 454 P.2d 387, 391 (1969).
133. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, Comment 8.
134. See Scotco, Inc. v. Dormeyer Indus., 402 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 1968)
cal or other testing is not permitted by the seller, actions based on
defects ascertainable only by such testing will not be barred. Also, a
buyer has a duty to perform only reasonable tests.13 5 In Ambassador
Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co.' s6 a Michigan court sustained a breach
of implied warranty claim for defective steel because the defect was
discoverable only through a carbon content test. The court felt that
this test was beyond the scope of a reasonable examination.1
7
Implied warranties also are excluded when a seller demands that
the buyer examine the goods and the buyer refuses. 3 ' The court in
Austin Lee Corp. v. Cascades Motel, Inc.,1 9 however, held that a
buyer was not responsible for discoverable defects because the seller
merely sent him two bedspreads and did not demand that he make
an examination. 40
B. Course of Dealing-Usage of Trade
Manufacturers can invoke a course of dealing, course of per-
formance, or usage of trade to justify exclusion or modification of
implied warranties.' 4' Both course of dealing and course of perform-
ance refer to conduct of the contracting parties. A course of dealing
is "a sequence of previous conduct between . . . parties . . . which
. . . [establishes] a common basis of understanding for interpreting
their expressions and other conduct."'142 Course of performance is
conduct under a contract that can 'be used to determine the meaning
of its terms. 43 A course of dealing allowed exclusion of implied war-
ranties in Country Clubs, Inc. v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing
Co.' 4  The Sixth Circuit found that discussions and written commu-
ciations between the parties clearly indicated knowledge and accept-
ance of the warranty exclusion. 145 In Asgrow Seed Co. v. Gulick1
4
1
a Texas court held that when a buyer should have known through
(hairline cracks in molds not a latent defect); Richards Mfg. Co. v. Gamel, 5 Wash.
App. 549, 550, 489 P.2d 366, 367 (1971) (defects in lamps not latent).
135. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, Comment 8.
136. 33 Mich. App. 495, 190 N.W.2d 275 (1971).
137. Id. at 503-04, 190 N.W.2d at 280. Contra, Richards Mfg. Co. v. Gamel, 5
Wash. App. 549, 550, 489 P.2d 366, 367 (1971).
138. Austin Lee Corp. v. Cascades Motel, Inc., 123 Ga. App. 642, 644, 182
S.E.2d 173, 174 (1971); Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 323, 521
P.2d 281, 290 (1974); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, Comment 8.
139. 123 Ga. App. 642, 182 S.E.2d 173 (1971).
140. Id. at 644, 182 S.E.2d at 174. But see Refrigeration Discount Corp. v.
Crouse, 79 York 31, 32 (Pa. C.P. 1965), in which the court, apparently ignoring
Comment 8 to § 2-316, held that a seller need only make the goods available for
inspection to qualify for an exclusion of implied warranties by examination.
141. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(3)(c).
142. Id. § 1-205(1).
143. Id. § 2-208(1).
144. 430 F.2d 1394 (6th Cir. 1970).
145. Id. at 1397.
146. 420 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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previous purchases of the same product that the seller limited its
liability, the buyer was bound by this limitation. 14 7  Another court
allowed the jury to consider a twelve-year course of dealing that
limited a jewelry carrier's liability to $200 in deciding whether a
similar contract contained the same limitation.1 8  A course of per-
formance also can be the basis for exclusion or modification of
implied warranties, as in Orr Chevrolet, Inc. v. Courtney,'49 which
upheld a manufacturer's warranty that excluded recovery for loss of
use. "Since '[buyer] had previously relied upon that warranty to
have his truck repaired, he cannot now repudiate it."'
50
Usage of trade refers to "any practice . . . having such regulari-
ty of observance as to justify an expectation that it will be observed
with respect to the transaction in question."' 51  Trade usages of the
business community within which a contract is framed have been
treated as an important element in ascertaining the meaning of con-
tractual provisions. 11 2 Trade usages, standing alone, can also create
terms affecting the contractual relationship between parties. Two
recent cases have held that trade usages established warranty disclaim-
ers in a used tractor sale' 5 ' and in a risk allocation policy for
drilling operations. 54 Before a trade usage can be used, however, its
existence and scope must be proven. 55
147. Id. at 444.
148. Sternheim v. Silver Bell of Roslyn, Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 726, 729, 321 N.Y.S.2d
965, 968 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971).
149. 488 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
150. Id. at 886.
151. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205(2). The meaning and effect of
trade usages under the Code was analyzed in Carroll, Harpooning Whales, Of Which
Karl N. Llewellyn Is The Hero of the Piece, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 139
[hereinafter cited as Carroll]; Levie, Trade Usage and Custom Under the Common
Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1101 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Levie].
Inclusion of trade usages as a means for disclaiming implied warranties complies %
with the Code's goal of conforming the law to current commercial practices. UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(2)(b).
152. See Baum Assoc. Inc. v. Society Brand Hat Co., 477 F.2d 255, 258 (8th
Cir. 1973); Kenneth Reed Constr. Corp. v. United States, 475 F.2d 583, 586-87 (Ct.
Cl. 1973); Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Pemberton, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d
720 (C.P. Phila.), aff'd per curiam, 196 Pa. Super. 180, 173 A.2d 780 (1961); cf.
George v. School Dist., No. 8R, 7 Ore. App. 183, 190, 490 P.2d 1009, 1012 (1971).
Trade usages, however, will not be used to modify unambiguous terms of a
contract. See Chung v. Park, 369 F. Supp. 959, 966 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Northwestern
Indus. Piping, Inc. v. United States, 467 F.2d 1308, 1314 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
153. Spurgeon v; Jamieson Motors, - Mont. , , 521 P.2d 924, 926-27
(1974).
154. Threadgill v. Peabody Coal Co., 34 Colo. App. 203, 207-08, 526 P.2d 676,
678 (1974).
155. Georgia Timberlands, Inc. v. Southern Airways Co., 125 Ga. App. 404,
The usage does not become law by way of stare decisis, and
it may even be that a court should not be able to take judicial
notice of a frequently proven usage of trade. This position is
supported by the change of the applicable language of the orig-
inal draft of section 1-205(2), which characterized questions
of the existence and scope of usages as 'questions of fact,' to
the present wording which requires existence and scope 'to be
proved as facts." 56
Testimony by one person that it was his custom not to charge
dissatisfied customers does not establish a trade usage. 157  On the
other hand, testimony of a series of witnesses affirming the existence
of a standard practice will qualify that practice as a trade usage.
158
The common-law requirements of universality and notoriety no long-
er apply.15 9 "Full recognition is . . . available for new usages and
for usages currently observed by the great majority of decent dealers,
even though dissidents ready to cut corners do not agree."' 60 Inclu-
sion of a practice within an industry or government trade code is
persuasive evidence of an accepted trade usage.' 6 '
Once the existence and scope of a trade usage have been demon-
strated, "it must be shown that the party had actual knowledge of the
existence of the trade usage or that the usage is so well established as
to justify a finding of constructive knowledge."'6 2  The proper test
for evaluating constructive knowledge is whether the trade usage is
sufficiently general that the parties can be assumed to have contracted
in reference thereto. 6  Courts presume that commercial contracts
incorporate existing trade usages without regard to whether both
parties actually knew of the usage. 64
Courts also examine the contracting parties' actions for consist-
ency with the alleged usage. In Spurgeon v. Jamieson Motors65
undisputed testimony indicated that the custom in the area was that
406, 188 S.E.2d 108, 110 (1972); see Threadgill v. Peabody Coal Co., 34 Colo. App.
203, 206, 526 P.2d 676, 677 (1974).
156. Carroll, supra note 151, at 167.
157. Englebrecht v. W.D. Brannan & Sons, Inc., 501 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973) (aerial sprayer).
158. Threadgill v. Peabody Coal Co., 34 Colo. App. 203, 207, 526 P.2d 676, 678
(1974). But cf. Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 App. Div. 2d 17, 22, 304 N.Y.S.2d
918, 923-24 (1969).
159. See Levie, supra note 151, which thoroughly reviews the differences be-
tween usage of trade under the Code and custom at common law. See also Comment,
Custom and Trade Usage, 55 COLUM. L. RE. 1192 (1955).
160. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205, Comment 5.
161. Carroll, supra note 151, at 165.
162. Threadgill v. Peabody Coal Co., 34 Colo. App. 203, 206, 526 P.2d 676, 677
(1974); see Flagg Realtors v. Harvel, 509 S.W.2d 885, 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974);
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205, Comment 4.
163. Threadgill v. Peabody Coal Co., 34 Colo. App. 203, 207, 526 P.2d 676, 678
(1974).
164. See, e.g., Graham v. Rockman, 504 P.2d 1351, 1355-56 (Alas. 1972) (and
cases cited therein).
165. - Mont. -, 521 P.2d 924 (1974).
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used machinery was not warranted except to the extent that a "50-50
warranty" was given on late model equipment. Under this warranty
the dealer paid one-half of repair costs and the purchaser the other
half. Buyer's knowledge of this custom was established by evidence
that during the first year after his purchase, he adhered to the custom
and paid one-half the cost of repairs. 6 '
Greater attention should be given to section 2-316(3)(c). In
light of the Code's declared purpose of permitting "the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agree-
ment of the parties,"'167 courts are willing to find disclaimers in trade
usages and courses of dealing.
V. Limitation of Damages and Remedies for Breach of Warranty
Even if warranties are not disclaimed pursuant to section 2-316,
remedies and damages for breach of warranty can be limited under
sections 2-718 and 2-719.168 Section 2-718 allows a commercial
contract to provide for reasonable liquidated damages. 169  To estab-
lish the reasonableness of a liquidated damage clause, the parties
must show (1) that no convenient or feasible alternative remedy
exists, (2) that it will be difficult to prove the amount of loss, and
(3) that the estimated damages reasonably approximate the actual
harm expected.
70
Section 2-719 permits parties to limit remedies and to limit or
exclude consequential damages.' 7' Courts have affirmed the use of
166. Id. at -, 521 P.2d at 927.
167. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1-102(2)(b).
168. Id. § 2-316(4): "Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in
accordance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages
and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719)."
169. Id. § 2-718(1):
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but
only at an amount which is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual
harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the incon-
venience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A
term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
170. id. § 2-718(1); see Moye, supra note 42, at 618-19.
171. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and
of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in sub-
stitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the
measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the
buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price or
to repair and replacement of nonconforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is ex-
pressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of
limited remedies between knowledgeable, commercial parties.172  In
Wyatt Industries, Inc. v. Publicker Industries, Inc. 7 1 the fabricator of
vessels for chemical plants sued a buyer for the contract price and the
buyer counterclaimed for breach of implied warranty. Even though
the fabricator was found liable for breach of implied warranty, the
court upheld the contractual clause limiting the buyer's damage re-
covery to $25,000.17 Unconscionable limitations, however, are inef-
fective.175  Under section 2-719(3) the "[l]imitation of consequen-
tial damages for injury to person in the case of consumer goods is
prima facie unconscionable .... ,,171
Even when unconsionability cannot be established, courts have
strictly construed these clauses. 177 The official comments to section
2-719 create "a presumption that clauses prescribing remedies are
cumulative rather than exclusive."178  An intention that a written
warranty be an exclusive remedy must be clearly expressed.' 79  A
warranty that stated, "No claims for the cost of removing, returning
or replacing defective parts or for other consequential damages will
be allowed," was held to exclude consequential damages, but other-
wise not to limit the buyer's remedies.8 0 Similarly, the Consumer
Product Warranties Act prohibits a warrantor of a consumer product
from excluding or limiting consequential damages "unless such ex-
clusion or limitation conspicuously appears on the face of the war-
ranty."'
1 8 1
Section 2-719(2) provides that when the limited remedy "fails
of its essential purpose," all other Code remedies can be used.'8 2  A
limited remedy fails of its essential purpose when it does not provide a
its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
(3) 'Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limita-
tion or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages
for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie uncon-
scionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
172. See V-M Corp. v. Bernard Distrib. Co., 447 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1971);
Wyatt Indus., Inc. v. Publicker Indus., Inc., 420 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying
Pa. law).
173. 420 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying Pa. law).
174. Id. at 457. The Seventh Circuit in V-M Corp. v. Bernard Distrib. Co., 447
F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1971), asserted that "[slection 2-719 was intended to
encourage and facilitate consensual allocations of risks associated with the sale of
goods. This is particularly true where commercial, rather than consumer sales are
involved."
175. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719, Comment 1, 3.
176. Id. § 2-719(3).
177. See, e.g., Water Works & Indus. Supply Co. v. Wilburn, 437 S.W.2d 951
(Ky. 1968); Henry v. W.S. Reichenbach & Son, Inc., 45 Pa. D. & C.2d 171 (C.P.
Lehigh 1968).
178. Council Bros. v. Ray Burner Co., 473 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 1973)
(emphasis in original).
179. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719, Comment 2.
180. Council Bros. v. Ray Burner Co., 473 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 1973). But
see Evans Mfg. Co. v. Wolosin, 47 Luz. 238 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
181. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2304(3) (Supp. 1976).
182. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(2).
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minimally adequate remedy or when it deprives a party of the value of
a bargain. 83 An interesting question is whether a court's finding
that a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose affects either the
exclusion of consequential damages or otherwise valid implied war-
ranty disclaimers. This issue was analyzed -in Koehring Co. v. A.P.I.,
Inc.,' 84 in which a federal district court held that certain conduct ob-
viated a limited remedy, but did not affect the validity of a separate
disclaimer of implied warranties." 5
VI. Effect of Disclaimers on Negligence and Strict Liability
A. Negligence
Manufacturers often attempt to effectuate far-reaching disclaim-
ers that seek to bar negligence claims as well as breach of warranty
actions. At common law a
private party may validly contract to relieve himself from liabil-
ity for the consequences of his own negligent acts .... However,
... 'contracts against liability for negligence are not favored by
the law,' and will be construed strictly, with every doubt resolved
against the party seeking their protection.' 8 6
Strictly construing attempts to disclaim negligence liability, courts
have required "that the provisions and terms of the contract clearly
and unequivocally spell out the intent to grant such immunity and
relief from liability."'
' 8 7
Courts are split over whether disclaimers must mention the term
"negligence" to be effective. In Empress Health & Beauty Spa, Inc.
v. Turner' the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the effectiveness of
an assumption of risk provision and noted that "[i]t is not necessary
that the word 'negligence' appear in the exculpatory clause . 189
183. Id., Comment 1.
184. 369 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
185. Id. at 887, 891; cf. County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'r Corp.,
323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320
F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Il. App. 2d 388, 261
N.E.2d 1 (1970).
186. Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 1216 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); accord, Phibbs v. Ray's Chev. Corp., 45 App. Div.
2d 897, -, 357 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (1974); Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. v.
Greenville Bus. Men's Ass'n, 423 Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620 (1966).
187. Dilks v. Flohr Chev., 411 Pa. 425, 436, 192 A.2d 682, 688 (1963)
(emphasis in original), quoted in Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422
F.2d 1205, 1217 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
188. -Tenn. -, 503 S.W.2d 188 (1973).
189. Id. at -, 503 S.W.2d at 190.
Decisions in a majority of jurisdictions are contrary, however. 190
These decisions are more in keeping with the common-law doctrine
that exculpatory provisions are to be strictly construed19 and with the
UCC's requirement of conspicuousness to insure buyer awareness of
the existence and meaning of disclaimers.' 92 The Virginia Supreme
Court has extended this concept by specifically imposing the conspic-
uousness requirement on negligence disclaimers.'
A question so far ignored by courts is whether the Code prohib-
its negligence disclaimers. A plausible argument can be made that
section 1-102(3) precludes all contracts that limit liability for negli-
gence. That section states, inter alia, that "the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may
not be disclaimed . . . ."'" Since proof of negligence requires
showing a breach of duty of reasonable care, 9 5 any disclaimer of
negligence liability could constitute an attempt to avoid obligations of
reasonableness and care and be barred by section 1-102(3). The
only case discussing the issue is Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Car-
bide Corp.'96 The Third Circuit, having already invalidated the dis-
claimer at bar on other grounds, left the question to a state court for
decision.' 97
B. Strict Liability
Recently courts have been concerned with whether disclaimers
created pursuant to the Code can bar strict liability claims. 98 Strict
liability is based on section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.199 Comment m to that section declares,
190. Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 1220 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); K & S Oil Well Serv., Inc. v. Cabot Corp., 491
S.W.2d 733, 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); see Keystone Aero. Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom
Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 1974).
191. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra.
192. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, Comment 1; see Omni Flying Club,
Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., - Mass. -, -, 315 N.E.2d 885, 888 (1974).
193. Lacks v. Bottled Gas Corp., 215 Va. 94, 96, 205 S.E.2d 671, 673 (1974).
194. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(3).
195. W. PROSSER & J. WADE, LAW OF TORTS 150 (5th ed. 1971).
196. 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
197. Id. at 1216 n.16; see Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846, 850
(3d Cir. 1967).
198. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239 (5th
Cir. 1974); Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974);
Keystone Aero. Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974); Iowa
Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Iowa
1973); Arrow Transp. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 289 F. Supp. 170 (D. Ore. 1968).
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property, if,
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
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The rule stated in this Section is not .. affected by limitations
on the scope and content of warranties, or by limitation to
'buyer' and 'seller' . . . . The consumer's cause of action does
not depend upon the validity of his contract with the person
from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected by
any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between the
seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompany-
ing the product into the consumer's hands .... 200
Recent decisions, however, have limited the applicability of com-
ment m to consumer contracts. In Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v.
R.J. Enstrom Corp.20' the Third Circuit noted that public policy pro-
hibits disclaimers of strict liability in a consumer setting, but does
not apply to purely commercial transactions between knowledgeable
corporations when only property loss is at issue.202
[F]reedom of con-tract should be permitted so that a corporate
purchaser may exercise its business judgment to forego claims
for liability against the seller in exchange for a lower price.
There is much to be said for this approach and its recognition
that relief from restrictions in a commercial context is not incon-
sistent with the purposes of § 402A, i.e., protection of the
average consumer who is not really in a position to bargain
effectively or intelligently. 20 3
The Fifth Circuit in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp.20 4 upheld the validity of a negligence and strict liability dis-
claimer that had been the subject of intensive negotiation between two
large corporations of substantially equal bargaining strength." °5 The
court relied on Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,20 6 in
which the California Court of Appeals reacted to a remarkably similar
fact situation:
[A]ll that is herein involved is the question of which of two equal
bargainers should bear the risk of economic loss if the product
sold proved to be defective. . . . Delta . . . bears that risk in
return for a purchase price acceptable to it . . . . We can see
no reason why Delta, having determined, as a matter of busi-
ness judgment, that the price fixed justified assuming the risk
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
200. Id., comment m at 356 (emphasis added).
201. 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974).
202. Id. at 148-49.
203. Id. at 149.
204. 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974).
205. Id. at 245-46.
206. 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965).
of loss, should now be allowed to shift the risk so assumed to
Douglas .... 207
The trend allowing disclaimers of strict liability is welcomed.
Manufacturers must remember, however, that these disclaimers must
be explicit to be effective. In Keystone Aeronautics the court con-
cluded that the clause, "R.J. Enstrom will be held harmless of any
liability in connection with this sale," was not a clear, unequivocal
expression of intent to exculpate onself from strict liability claims
and, therefore, was ineffective.'" 8 In Arrow Transportation Co. v.
Fruehauf Corp. °9 a federal district court held a broad disclaimer
ineffective against strict liability claims. "Although the language of
the disclaimer is broad, it immediately follows language limited to
express and implied warranties, thus requiring the invocation of the
rule of ejusdem generis.""
By upholding disclaimers of strict liability in certain commercial
settings, courts are moving toward legal symmetry between warranty
actions under the Code and products liability claims under section
402A. The virtues of this symmetry have been proclaimed by many
courts21' and commentators. 212  In Kassab v. Central Soya 13 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared that "[t]o permit the result
of a lawsuit to depend solely on the caption atop plaintiffs complaint
is not now, and has never been, a sound resolution of identical
controversies. 214  Other states have simply abandoned the strict
liability-implied warranty dichotomy in favor of a unified products
207. Id. at 104-05, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 524. This approach was also enunciated in
Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25, 32 (S.D.
Iowa 1973):
The plaintiff is a large corporation, fully cognizant of commercial law. The
doctrine of strict liability in tort, designed to aid the consumer in an un-
equal bargaining position who is physically injured, loses all meaning when
a large public utility or other large company is the plaintiff and is suing
solely for commercial loss. Accordingly, under these facts, the Court holds
that the doctrine of strict liability in tort is not available to this plaintiff.
208. 499 F.2d at 150.
209. 289 F. Supp. 170 (D. Ore. 1968).
210. Id. at 173. The ejusdem generis rule of construction states that when
general words follow specific provisions, the general words are construed to apply
only to persons or things of the same class as those specifically mentioned. BLACK'S
LAw DICrIoNARY 608 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
211. E.g. Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182
N.W.2d 800 (1970); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974);
Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
212. E.g., Donnelly, After the Fall of the Citadel, 19 SYRAc. L. RaV. 1, 32-33
(1967); Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 5 (1965); cf. Franklin, When Worlds Collide:
Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Products, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974
(1966); Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss, and the UCC, 40 TENN. L REV.
309 (1973).
For a thorough review of the differences between the Code and § 402A see
Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 22 STAN. L REV. 713 (1970).
213. 423 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
214. Id. at 229, 246 A.2d at 853.
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liability cause of action.2 15 In cases of personal injury to consumers
consistency has been attained through application of the UCC's un-
conscionabiity provision2 11 to bar disclaimers of implied warran-
ties.217 Thus, no reason exists to prevent courts from moving further
toward legal symmetry by permitting disclaimers of strict liability
between business entities of substantially equal bargaining power in
cases other than personal injury.
VII. Conclusion
Manufacturers should continue to use disclaimers as a means of
controlling their potential losses. Although courts strictly apply the
Code's demanding requirements, an effective disclaimer is possible,
especially in commercial transactions. In sales to commercial parties
manufacturers often can avoid allegations of unconscionability and
make use of disclaimers to prevent negligence and strict liability
claims.
JOHN F. STOVIAK
215. Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800
(1970); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
216. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
217. See, e.g., Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
